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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
court properly acted within its discretion in regulating the admission of opinion
based on direct knowledge and the premises underlying this opinion.
Although defense counsel was attempting to convey to the jury the impression that its expert had actual knowledge of defendant's alleged intoxication
by his question after the hypothetical problem, there appears no valid reason
for the Court to hold as a matter of law that the question should have been
answered and that no objection shouild have been made. The position of the
question immediately following the hypothetical, although misleading, could
have been posed in another form, alerting the jury to the fact that the question
was being asked with regard to the expert's personal observation. Indeed,
since the court has discretion in regulating whether a medical expert should
prefix his opinion with reasons, perhaps it should also instruct the person
posing the question on the desired procedure, so as not to confuse the jury.
Reversal, nonetheless, was warranted, since the immaterial testimony of the
prosecution's witness tended to cloud the question of insanity. Testimony
elicited by a psychiatrist, appointed by the court to determine defendant's
ability to understand the charge, is a humanitarian gesture at most. Reports
by such psychiatrists are not admissible by statute,0 and testimony, by the same
token, should not be introduced. Information obtained by such an investigation
may amount to testimonial compulsion. 7 Moreover, capacity to understand
the charge and to defend it at the time of trial involve different norms than
insanity at the time of the commission of the act. 8 Although a person may
be deemed guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, our society has recognized that
a criminal act may be excused if the defendant was legally insane. Since the
defendant in the instant case predicated his entire defense on the ground of
insanity, he should be allowed to present this defense without being hampered
by evidence which is not in issue.
L. H.S.
READING OF INFLAmmATORY ARTICLES BY JURORS HELD NOT ENOUGH
WARRANT MISTRIAL

To

In People v. Genovese' the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction on the charge that he acted as a fight manager without having procured
the required license.? The Court was concerned with the question of whether
the defendant had been denied federal as well as state due process. After the
jurors had been sworn but prior to the introduction of evidence, four articles
appeared in three New York newspapers which reflected unfavorably on the
defendant's character. 3 Defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the publica6. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 662.
7. People v. Roth, supra note 5, at 83, 181 N.E.2d at 441, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
8.

Ibid.

1. 10 N.YS.2d 478, 180 N.E.2d

419, 225 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1962).
2. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8907, 8933 (McKinney 1961).
3. One of the articles referred to the defendant as a convicted narcotics boss. The
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tion of these articles was denied. The trial judge then conducted a voir dire
examination of the jurors which disclosed that eight of them had read some
of these articles. Six of these jurors were allowed to remain when they declared
that they had not been influenced by the articles and that they could arrive
at a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court. Held: one justice
dissenting, the defendant was not prejudiced when the trial judge in the
exercise of his discretion dismissed defendant's motion for a mistrial.
The defendant relied on Irvin v. Doud4 in urging a violation of due
process. However, the majority correctly pointed out that the situation in
Irvin was clearly distinguishable. There, the community was aroused by six
murders. After the defendant's arrest there followed months of radio and press
comments highly unfavorable to the defendant. Hundreds of prospective jurors
had to be excused because they had fixed opinions as to the defendant's guilt.
Of the twelve jurors who were finally selected, eight stated that they believed
the defendant to be guilty but that they thought they could render an impartial
verdict. The defendant was convicted, and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
stating that "where so many so many times admitted prejudice such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight." 5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, stated the true basis of the decision: "How can fallible men and
women reach a disinterested verdict based exclusively on what they hear in
court when before they entered the jury box their minds were saturated by
press and radio for months preceding by matter designed to establish the guilt
of the accused? A conviction so secured constitutes a denial of due process
of law in its most rudimentary conception." 6 It is clear that Irvin v. Doued is
an extreme case and represents only a minimal standard for due process. In
Marshall v. United States7 cited in defendant's brief,8 it was held that a
federal judge had abused his discretion in refusing defendant's motion for a
mistrial where material which he had previously ruled too prejudicial to be
admitted as evidence reached some of the jurors through the medium of the
press. The Court so held despite the fact that the jurors in question assured the
judge that they could decide the case solely on the evidence presented at the
trial. The Court went on by way of dictum to say that a trial judge has great
discretion in areas such as this and that each case must turn on its own facts. It
thus appears that Marshall v. United States does not represent the beginning of
a standard in the area of federal abuse of discretion. The majority in the instant
case, remarking that prejudice is a matter of degree, dismissed the Marshall
case with a footnote.9
article further stated that the defendant was the chief lieutenant of an underworld boxing
commissioner. Another article declared that the defendant would have been indicted on
eighteen rather than two counts had it not been for the statute of limitations.
4. 366 U.S. 717 (1960).
5. Id.at 728.
6. Supra note 4, at 729-730.
7. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
8. Brief for Appellant p. 30.
9. People v. Genovese, supra note 1, at 483, 180 N.E.2d at 422, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
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Judge Desmond in his dissent argued that the newspaper articles in
question were inflammatory and that "jurors who would not be influenced by
accusations such as those made in the newspapers against this defendant would
either be of a kind whose minds for some reason do not react at all to what
they read or those whose existing prejudices had already hardened to a point
where nothing could worsen them."' 0° He went on to say that New York ought
to hold to standards no lower than those which would be supported by Irvin
v. Doud and Marshall v. United States.
Prior to 1872 the law in New York was that a fixed opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of a defendant held by a prospective juror operated in law
to disqualify him on a challenge for cause even though he stated that he could
decide the case impartially without regard for his previously formed opinion."
This common law was changed by c. 475 section 1 of the act of 187212 which
declared that:
The previous expression of an opinion . . . in reference to the guilt
or innocence of the prisoner or a present opinion . . . in reference

thereto, shall not be a sufficient ground of challenge for principal
cause to any person ... qualified to serve as a juror; provided the
person proposed

. . .

shall declare on oath that he ...

believes he can

render an impartial verdict according to the evidence ... and provided
the court shall be satisfied that the person so proposed as a juror does
not entertain such a present opinion as would influence his verdict
as a juror.
The facts of the instant case do not fit squarely within the words of the quoted
statute. Here the jury had already been sworn, and those jurors who were
allowed to remain had not formed any opinion as to the defendant's guilt from
what they had read. It thus appears that the instant case presents a situation
less serious than that contemplated by the statute. There appears to be no
logical reason why the test imposed by the statute ought not to be extended to
situations where the jury has been sworn, especially where no evidence has
been introduced; therefore, the Court's conclusion in the instant case is not
surprising. The question remains, however, whether even a man of good faith
can succeed in disregarding impressions and opinions formed from reading or
listening to highly charged accounts of a defendant's background. There are
many who would agree with Judge Desmond when he stated in his dissent:
"I refuse to concede, however .. . that we must be satisfied by the incredible
statements of jurors that they can read such stuff and then wipe it off their
minds."'

3

Of course, the solution to the difficulty lies not in asking jurors if they
can disregard what they have read, but rather in seeing to it that the news
10. Id. at 486, 180 N.E.2d at 424, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
11. Cancemi v. People, 16 N.Y. 501 (1858); Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (1847).
12. Substantially incorporated in N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 376(2).
13. People v. Genovese, supra note 1, at 487, 180 N.E.2d at 424, 425, 225 N.Y.S.2d
at 33, 34.
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media exercise restraint in the printing and broadcasting of material damaging
to a defendant. In the past, the press and radio have had great difficulty in
exercising self-restraint and ultimately the United States Supreme Court may
have to decide the limits which the Fourteenth Amendment places on the
power of the states to provide for adequate safeguards concerning interference
with the right of fair trial by news media. As yet the Supreme Court has not
reached this question, and until it does, a defendant's hope for a fair trial must
rest, after the exhaustion of pre-emptory challenges, on the intuitive judgment
of the trial judge.
R.J.D.

THIRD DEGREE ASSAULT NOT ExCUSED BY

REASONABLE MISTARE 01

FACT

The defendant in a criminal prosecution for third degree assault asserted
a defense of a reasonable mistake of fact. He was charged with actively intervening in the lawful arrest of a youth by two plainclothes policemen, who were
engaged in a struggle with the boy. Defendant, arriving at the scene, saw two
middle-aged men, undistinguished by their dress, fighting with a young boy,
who, crying and with his pants half-off, was struggling to escape his tormentors.
Without thought of personal risk, defendant went to the rescue. The intermediate court, one judge dissenting, reversed the conviction. On appeal by
permission, held, reversed, and information reinstated. The intervention regardless of intent amounted to third degree assault, since the statutory offense
does not require mens rea. The mistake of fact, in spite of its reasonableness,
does not excuse the act specifically charged, because the needs of an orderly
society demand that police officers go unhindered in the pursuit of their duties.
People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962)
(per curiam).
Third degree assault has generally been regarded as requiring only a
general intent,1 that is, the intent to perform the physical act of the crime,
without any malice attendant upon the performance of the act. 2 The mere fact
of an unlawful touching is sufficient to support the charge.3 This statutory concept of assault is far removed from the common law requirement of mens rea,
an essential element of the crime. The criminal codification in New York,
however, omits the specific intent required in the higher gradations of assault.4
The Court properly held that in the ordinary, simple assault charge the law
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 244:
Assault in third degree
A person who: 1. Commits an assault, or an assault and battery, not such as
is specified in sections two hundred and forty and two hundred and forty-two ...
Is guilty of assault in the third degree.
2. People (Starvis) v. Rogers, 170 Misc. 609, 10 N.Y.S.2d 722 (City Ct. 1939);
1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 338 (12th ed. 1957).
3. See People ex rel. Gow v. Bingham, 57 Misc. 66, 107 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (Sup. Ct.
1907), where the photographing and measuring of a person accused of a crime was held
to be third degree assault.

4. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240, 242.

